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CHILD SUPPORT SAVINGS ACCOUNTS: AN
INNOVATIVE APPROACH TO CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT
MONICA HOF WALLACE'
The national child support epidemic needs a long-term, progressive
solution to reinvigorate nonpaying noncustodians, and this Article
proposes a Child Support Savings Account as one solution. In this
Article, I urge state governments, in coordination with financial
institutions, to offer an account into which noncustodial parents
deposit child support payments and from which custodial parents,
through the use of a debit card, gain immediate access to the funds.
I likewise urge the federal government to offer a federal tax benefit
for noncustodial parents who elect to use a Child Support Savings
Account, a concept that already exists in the Internal Revenue Code
for health and dependent care accounts. A tax-free account to care
for a child of a broken home is a natural derivative, and
contemporary social policy demands it.
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INTRODUCTION
A woman once described her battle over child support payments:
"I could see his hand shaking when he wrote the check to me. He hated
me so much. He was convinced that I sat home and ate Bon-Bons on
his nickel. It was a constant fight to get the monthly check."1 The
nonpayment of child support is a national epidemic that negatively
affects the well-being of children.2 Unfortunately, many couples who
once shared a life and a family together now harbor resentment and
distrust, and their children's psychological and financial well-being is
lost in the acrimony. Furthermore, more children are born out of
wedlock than ever before,3 leaving some children longing for emotional
and financial support. With progressive and creative legislation, state
and federal governments could ease the financial tension between
parents to ensure that more dollars are given to those who need it-the
children. A Child Support Savings Account ("CSSA") offers one
solution.
This Article proposes that state governments, in coordination with
financial institutions, offer an account into which noncustodial parents
deposit child support payments and from which custodial parents can
access the funds.4 These funds would be the property of the minor and
could be used by the custodial parent at any time for child-related
expenditures. The custodial parent would be issued a debit card and a
checkbook on the savings account from which she could access the
deposited funds.' The funds would be immediately available to the
1. The idea for this Article came from a student who took my Civil Law of Persons
(Family Law) class and explained the vengeful relationship with her ex-husband.
Although she will remain nameless, I thank her for illuminating a problem that has yet to
be recognized in the law.
2. See discussion infra Part I.C.
3. JOYCE A. MARTIN ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORT, BIRTHS: FINAL
DATA FOR 2003, at 2 (2005) ("The proportion of all births to unmarried women increased
to 34.6 percent; this measure has risen steadily since the late 1990s.").
4. The "noncustodial" parent is the parent without primary physical custody of the
child. The "custodial" parent is the parent with whom the child primarily resides.
5. In discussing my proposal, I often refer to the payor/noncustodial parent as male
and the payee/custodian as female. Although I recognize that these traditional roles may
not always apply, evidence exists that almost 85% of custodial parents are mothers. See
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custodial parent-and therefore the child-and a spending record
would exist, even though generally it would be unavailable to the
noncustodian.
In addition, the federal government should offer a federal tax
benefit for noncustodial parents who use a Child Support Savings
Account, providing motivation for maintaining child support.
Historically, child support has been enforced through punitive measures
such as fines and jail time.6 Although negative repercussions may
motivate some parents to pay child support, providing a positive
consequence for supporting the child would cause other parents to meet
their obligation more frequently and more willingly. Tax-advantaged
savings accounts already exist for health and dependent care expenses;7
providing support for a child of a broken home is a natural derivative.
The financial and psychological benefits that would result for
children and their parents could be significant. First, from a financial
standpoint, increasing the collection of child support could prevent
some children from falling into poverty. The amount owed in child
support would be withheld from the payor parent's wages and deposited
into the account, making dollars immediately available to the custodial
parent. More dollars would be filtered to the child because courts and
parents could take into account the tax benefit afforded the payor
parent and assign those additional dollars to the amount paid in child
support. The net loss of tax dollars would be offset by the decline in
government-related assistance to the child. Psychologically, children
benefit from increased assistance from their parents. Having both
parents providing emotionally and monetarily validates the worth of the
child as part of a family.
Additionally, the custodial parent will be more likely to receive
child support because either the amount will be withheld by the
noncustodian's employer or the noncustodian will pay into the account,
rather than making payments directly to the former spouse or
companion. The noncustodian may feel better protected because a
record of expenditures would exist. The interaction between the
TIMOTHY S. GRALL, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CUSTODIAL
MOTHERS AND FATHERS AND THEIR CHILD SUPPORT: 2001, at 4 (2003), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p60-225.pdf.
6. Drew D. Hansen, The American Invention of Child Support: Dependency and
Punishment in Early American Child Support Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1123, 1149 (1999).
7. 26 U.S.C. § 105 (2000) (health care flexible spending account); id. § 129
(dependent care flexible spending account); 26 U.S.C. § 223 (Supp. IV 2004) (health
spending account).
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parents would be limited to nonfinancial activities that involve the child.
In turn, the acrimony may subside.
State and federal governments have worked diligently to reduce
child support arrearages and collect ongoing child support obligations.8
Although some enforcement techniques have been successful, the gap
between child support due and child support unpaid continues to grow.9
That is not to suggest that traditional means of enforcement should be
abandoned. Rather, innovative ideas like a CSSA should be tested to
challenge the enforcement paradigm.
This Article first explains the need for reform. Part I outlines the
federal law governing child support enforcement. Additionally, the
reader will get a sense of the financial and psychological suffering of
both children and parents when faced with nonpayment of child
support. Part II of this Article delves into the reasons parents do not
pay child support and considers the type of reform necessary to address
these concerns. Part III presents the logistics of the CSSA, including
the proposed tax benefits. Part III also outlines the advantages, both
psychological and financial, that a CSSA can offer. Finally, the Article
concludes that creating Child Support Savings Accounts would increase
the amount of child support collected and may improve parent-parent
and parent-child relationships.
I. THE NEED FOR REFORM
A. The Law Governing Child Support Enforcement
Historically, only state governments were tasked with enforcement
of child support orders."0 The federal government became involved in
child support enforcement in the latter half of the twentieth century.1
At that point, the social landscape of the country had begun to change,
and steadily rising divorce rates, coupled with an escalating number of
children born to single mothers, placed a new strain on the funds of the
Nation's public assistance program.12
8. See infra Part I.A.
9. See infra Part I.B.
10. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 108TH CONG., GREEN BOOK, SEC. 8-
CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM 8.2 (Comm. Print 2004) [hereinafter GREEN
BOOK].
11. See id. (noting that child support for welfare children was the exception to the
general public notion that child support was a domestic relations issue and solely a matter
for state courts).
12. Id. "Divorce rates increased dramatically between 1965 and 1974, when the
annual number of divorces nationwide more than doubled to 977,000." OFFICE OF CHILD
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ESSENTIALS FOR
[Vol. 851158
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In these early stages of federal involvement, the government
focused on collecting support owed to a single group of the Nation's
children-those living in families receiving assistance under national
welfare programs.13 A large motivating force behind the federal
government's entrance into the field was purely economic-an attempt
to cut federal welfare spending by transferring the financial burden of
supporting welfare children back to the children's delinquent parents. 4
In the mid-1970s, the focus of the federal government's
involvement in child support enforcement shifted to include the needs
of children and families not receiving public assistance. 5 This new wave
of federal involvement began with the Social Services Amendments of
1974, which created Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. 6 Title IV-D
gave rise to a new federal initiative, the Child Support Enforcement and
Paternity Establishment Program. 7 This novel program evidenced a
congressional push to prevent families not receiving government
benefits from entering the welfare system by helping them obtain child
support and establish paternity for children born outside of marriage. 8
Title IV-D also created an Assistant Secretary of Child Support,
who reports to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services, and directed the Assistant Secretary to administer, oversee,
and assist in the implementation of the states' child support
enforcement programs.19 The Social Services Amendments of 1974
ATTORNEYS IN CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT (3d ed. 2002), available at http://www.
acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2002/reports/essentials [hereinafter ESSENTIALS FOR
ATrORNEYS]. The percentage of births occurring during a first marriage decreased from
81.1% between 1965 and 1969 to 58.9% between 1990 and 1994. AMARA BACHU,
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, TRENDS IN PREMARITAL
CHILDBEARING: 1930 TO 1994, at 7 (1999), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
99pubs/p23-197.pdf. From 1990 to 1994, 35.1% of births occurred before a first marriage,
up from 16.8% during the 1965 to 1969 time period. Id.
13. GREEN BOOK, supra note 10, at 8-2. From 1950 to 1975, the federal government
focused its child support enforcement efforts solely on the children of families receiving
benefits under Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC"). Id.
14. Id. In an effort to shift the welfare burden to absentee parents, AFDC required
the states' welfare agencies to notify law enforcement when a child abandoned by a parent
began receiving benefits. Id.
15. See id. (stating that the motivation was to prevent families from needing public
assistance).
16. Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101, 88 Stat. 2337, 2351
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
17. GREEN BOOK, supra note 10, at 8-2.
18. Id.
19. 42 U.S.C.A. § 652 (West 2003 & Supp. 2006). The Secretary's duties include
"establish[ingl such standards for State programs for locating noncustodial parents,
establishing paternity, and obtaining child support." Id. § 652(a)(1). The Secretary also
evaluates the overall success of state programs established pursuant to the Act, id.
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placed responsibility for the enforcement of all child support obligations
(to welfare and nonwelfare children) at both the federal and state
levels.2" Primarily, the federal role was to oversee and evaluate state
and local agencies implementing the federal laws.21
The federal government continued its involvement in the arena of
child support enforcement law with the passage of additional legislation
in the years following the Social Services Amendments of 1974. In 1981,
Title IV-D was amended by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act,22
which authorized both state and federal government to withhold
portions of funds due to delinquent obligors and reroute those funds to
the child.23 For instance, it authorized the Internal Revenue Service to
withhold portions of the federal income tax refunds of noncustodial
parents who owed child support.24 It also required that states withhold
portions of unemployment benefit payments to parents owing support
in order to fulfill their delinquent obligation.'
Next, Congress passed the Child Support Enforcement
Amendments of 1984.26 These amendments equalized many services
between welfare and nonassisted families27 and improved interstate
enforcement of child support orders.28 Most importantly, the 1984
amendments required each state to use improved enforcement
techniques, such as (1) mandatory income withholding; (2) expedited
§ 652(a)(4), and provides overall technical assistance to the states in implementing their
programs, id. § 652(a)(7).
20. See, e.g., id. § 654 (establishing standards for state plans for child support). Every
state must provide enforcement services free of charge to welfare recipients, while
nonwelfare families are charged a minimal fee. Id. § 654(6).
21. See, e.g., id. § 652(b) (allowing the Secretary of Treasury, upon certification by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, to collect state child support owed under an
approved state plan).
22. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357
(codified in scattered titles and sections of the U.S.C.).
23. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 664 (West 2003 & Supp. 2006) (adding additional child support
provisions).
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 664(a)(2)(A) (2000) (setting out the procedure for the Secretary of
Treasury to withhold the tax refund of any parent who owes child support and divert it to
the appropriate state agency).
25. See id. § 2335; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 25-4-152 (LexisNexis 2000); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 443.051 (West 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-11-19 (2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 23:1693 (1998 & Supp. 2007); MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-5-516 (West 1999).
26. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat.
1305 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 606 (1994), repealed by Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 103, 110 Stat. 2105, 2112
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-10, 612-13, 615-17 (2000)) (preserving certain
benefits for families deemed ineligible once in receipt of child support).
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 655(e) (2000) (establishing grants to promote interstate
enforcement of child support obligations).
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processes for establishing and enforcing support orders; (3) state income
tax refund interceptions; (4) liens against real and personal property,
and security or bonds to assure compliance with support obligations;
and (5) reports of support delinquency information to consumer
reporting agencies. 2
9
These amendments produced a nationwide mandate to make
existing enforcement techniques more effective by supplementing
ordinary wage withholding procedures with new initiatives such as
allowing states to withhold portions of their state income tax refunds. °
Most importantly, these amendments allowed states to use child support
enforcement techniques that proved to be more effective against
delinquent parents without traditional wage-earning jobs. By moving
away from simple income withholding, these newer enforcement
techniques, such as the ability to report nonpaying parents to credit
bureaus,31 coupled with the strengthening of traditional mechanisms like
real and personal property liens,32 made nonpaying parents feel the
effects of their irresponsibility in more aspects of their everyday lives.
The Family Support Act ("FSA") of 1988 was yet another federal
initiative in the area of child support enforcement.33 The FSA focused
on immediate wage withholding' and locating absent parents.35 The
FSA also required that each state have an operational automated
national child support enforcement system. 36
29. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666 (West 2003 & Supp. 2006); see also Linda Henry Elrod, The
Federalization of Child Support Guidelines, 6 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 103, 115-16
(1990) (outlining the various statutory changes made by the Child Support Enforcement
Amendments of 1984).
30. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 40-18-100 to -109 (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2006); GA.
CODE ANN. § 19-11-18(a) (2004 & Supp. 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 47:299.31 to .41
(2001 & Supp. 2007); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 27-7-501 to -519.
31. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.1354 (West 2005 & Supp. 2007); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 46:56(M) (1999 & Supp. 2007); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-11-69; TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 231.114 (Vernon 2002).
32. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 30-3-191 to -200 (LexisNexis 1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-
11-18; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-16,119(f)(1) (2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:236.15(D)(1)(b); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 157.312 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2006).
33. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 666(b)(3) (2000) (establishing immediate garnishment of an absent
parent's wages, regardless of whether the parent is in arrears, with some exceptions).
35. The FSA aided states'in finding absent parents and in holding them responsible
for child support payments by allowing states to access wage and unemployment
compensation claims, 42 U.S.C.A. § 653 (West 2003 & Supp. 2006), and by instituting a
requirement that every state-issued birth certificate evidence each parent's social security
number. 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(2)(C)(ii) (2000).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 654(24) (requiring states to establish automated data processing and
information retrieval systems).
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The most recent major federal child support enforcement initiative
was contained in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 ("PRWORA").3 7 PRWORA required
states' child support enforcement systems to comply with both new and
existing federal standards before that state became eligible to receive
federal dollars for Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
("TANF").38 The legislation also required states to institute tougher
enforcement techniques, such as additional income withholding,39
seizure of assets,4" and withholding and suspension of licenses.4"
PRWORA also established a National Directory of New Hires aimed at
cracking down on delinquent parents across state lines.42
PRWORA augmented many of the federal enforcement initiatives
that had come about in previous legislative actions and mandated that
all states implement new enforcement tactics. One of the nontraditional
enforcement techniques that the Act required state systems to support
was the revocation or denial of a nonpaying parent's licenses.43 Another
37. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-10, 612-13, 615-17
(2000)).
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(2) (requiring a state to certify that it will operate a child
support enforcement program approved under federal law in order to be eligible to
receive TANF). PRWORA abolished the Aid for Families with Dependent Children
welfare program and replaced it with TANF, a program for block grants directed to states.
GREEN BOOK, supra note 10, at 8-3.
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1) (mandating income withholding procedures, with
exceptions).
40. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(a)(14) (West 2003 & Supp. 2006) (mandating creation of
state procedures for the identification and seizure of an obligor's assets on request from
another state).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(16) (2000) (mandating procedures giving states the
authority "to withhold or suspend ... driver's licenses, professional and occupational
licenses, and recreational and sporting licenses").
42. Id. § 653a. Under PRWORA, the National Directory of New Hires mandated
that states require employers to report all new hires within the first twenty days of their
employment to child support enforcement authorities. Id. § 653a(b)(2). This new
requirement aided enforcement authorities not only in locating absent parents but also in
the process of wage withholding.
43. See supra note 41. The particular licensed activities over which this mechanism
extends vary from state to state. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-170 (LexisNexis 1998 & Supp.
2006) (covering occupational, professional, sporting, recreational activity, and driving
licenses); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.13015 to .13016 (West 2006) (covering driving,
professional, and occupational licenses); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-11-9.3 (2004) (covering
professional, occupational, and driver's licenses); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:315.30 to .36
(2000 & Supp. 2007) (impeding issuance of driving, professional, sporting, hunting, and
fishing licenses); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-11-153 (West 1999 & Supp. 2006) (covering
driving, professional, occupational, hunting, fishing, and alcoholic beverage sales licenses);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 232.001 (Vernon 2002) (covering professional, occupational,
driving, and recreational licenses).
CHILD SUPPORT SAVINGS ACCOUNTS
nontraditional enforcement technique highlighted by PRWORA is the
denial or revocation of a passport to a parent owing more than $5,000 of
child support.' These two strategies took aim not at delinquent
parents' wallets but at their personal preferences, individual mobility,
and daily life activities.
In 1998, Congress passed two additional statutes, one intended to
promote child support collection and the other to punish nonpayors.
The Child Support Performance and Incentive Act45 provides new
incentive payments to states that comply with federal guidelines4 6 and
alternative penalty reductions to states whose compliance plans would
otherwise be disapproved, but are making a good faith effort to correct
their deficiencies.47  Congress also passed the Deadbeat Parents
Punishment Act of 1998,48 which stiffened criminal sanctions for failing
to pay child support by increasing the maximum jail sentence and
providing for mandatory restitution equal to the total support
obligation.49
Today, there is increasing legislative resolve at both federal and
state levels to improve the collection of child support payments. The
Office of Child Support Enforcement ("OCSE") has implemented
innovative guidelines for states to follow in their child support collection
efforts.5° And, although each state administers its own child support
enforcement program, the federal government plays a major role in
each program's oversight, implementation, and monitoring.51
44. 42 U.S.C.A. § 652(k) (West 2003 & Supp. 2006). On October 1, 2006, the
threshold amount of child support owed to warrant a denial of passport was decreased to
$2,500. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, § 7303, Pub. L. No. 109-171 (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 652(k)(1), 654(31)).
45. Child Support Performance and Incentive Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-200, 112
Stat. 645 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1169 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 603-04, 651-69, 671
(2000)).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 658a (2000).
47. Id. § 655(a). Additionally, the Act created a working group to study and report on
the "impediments to effective enforcement of medical support" by state Title IV-D
agencies. Id. § 651.
48. Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-187, 112 Stat. 618
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2000)).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 228(c)-(d).
50. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., HANDBOOK ON CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT (2005), available at
http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2005/handbook on cse.pdf.
51. GREEN BOOK, supra note 10, at 8-2. The federal government shapes state law by
conditioning welfare funding on meeting certain standards imposed by the OCSE. Id. at 8-3.
Additionally, if the state program meets certain standards, the state receives a portion of its
program's cost from the federal coffers. Id.
2007] 1163
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The Child Support Enforcement Program "has changed from one
that recoups welfare costs to one which serves a mostly non-welfare
clientele."52  Federal involvement in child support enforcement has
come a long way from its initial economically motivated entrance into
this area of law. In approximately fifty years, federal legislation has
become the overarching force behind states' child support enforcement
efforts, regardless of the family's financial situation. 3 Over the next
fifty years, federal and state governments should continue to reexamine
and refine enforcement techniques to capture every dollar that belongs
to a child.
B. Results of Collection Efforts
Overall, federal involvement in child support enforcement has
increased the collection of support payments by custodial parents. 4
Over the past ten years, however, the percentage of parents receiving
part or full child support payments due has stagnated.55 Approximately
25 % of custodial parents who are entitled to child support are receiving
none at all and 30% are receiving only part of what is due to them. 56
The system needs a catalyst to reinvigorate noncustodians and expand
the enforcement paradigm that has existed for several years.
According to the most recent survey by the U.S. Census Bureau,
conducted in 2001, there were 13.4 million custodial parents, ages fifteen
years or older, with children under twenty-one years of age, living
without the other parent.57 Of these 13.4 million custodial parents, 6.9
52. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT FY 2002 AND FY 2003 ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2005/
reports/annual-report.
53. The benefits of federal law affecting child support enforcement apply only to the
states themselves or the clients of the state IV-D agency. If a client represented by a
private attorney wishes to use any of the enforcement mechanisms, such as diverting
income tax refunds, they must be referred to the state IV-D agency. See 2 HOMER H.
CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 17.3 (2d ed.
1988).
54. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-377, CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT: BETTER DATA AND MORE INFORMATION ON UNDISTRIBUTED
COLLECTIONS ARE NEEDED 6 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d04377.pdf (tabulating the child support dollars collected as a result of the federal tax
intercept program).
55. See GRALL, supra note 5, at 7 fig.5 (charting the proportion of custodial parents
receiving partial and full payment of child support).
56. See id.
57. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CHILD SUPPORT: 2001, at
5 tbl.4, available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/childsupport/chldsu01.pdf
[hereinafter CHILD SUPPORT].
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million were due child support from an absent parent.58 To these 6.9
million parents, $34.9 billion in support was due, and $21.9 billion in
support was received, leaving a $13 billion child support deficit.5 9 This
deficit affected 55% of custodial parents due child support; in other
words, only 45% of custodial parents due child support received the full
amount in 2001.6
The proportion of custodial parents receiving the full amount of
child support due increased from 37% to 46% between 1993 and 1997,
and the 2001 proportion remained relatively unchanged at 45 %.61 The
proportion of custodial parents receiving some payments, however, fell
from 39% in 1993 to 28.6% in 1999 and remained unchanged in 2001.62
Overall, the increase in parents receiving full support was met by the
decrease in parents receiving partial payments, and the total number of
parents receiving partial or full child support-74% in 2001-remained
relatively the same over the eight-year span.63 In other words,
approximately one quarter of custodial parents due child support are
consistently receiving nothing.
Even though the percentage of custodial parents who did not
receive any child support due to them has remained the same over the
past eight years, the total child support deficit has increased. The child
support deficit increased 30%, from $10 billion in 1993 to $13 billion in
2001, leaving considerable child support dollars unpaid.' Over the last
half century, federal and state governments have improved collection
efforts,65 but the amount due to children has increased. There are
nearly four million parents seeking child support due and unpaid.66 The
detrimental effects on children, both financial and psychological,
require the government to reevaluate collection strategies and
58. GRALL, supra note 5, at 4 tbl.B. Approximately 7.9 million custodial parents had
child support agreements or awards in 2002, but 1.1 million of those parents were "not due
child support payments because either the child(ren) were too old, the noncustodial
parent died, the family lived together part of the year, or some other reason." Id. at 6 n.8.
59. CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 57, at 2 tbl.1.
60. Of the 6.9 million custodial parents due support, 3.1 million (or 45%) received the
full amount of child support due to them, leaving 3.8 million custodial parents (or 55%)
who received either some or no child support. GRALL, supra note 5, at 7.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. In 1993, 75.8% of custodial parents received partial or full child support
payments due. Id. These percentages ranged from 75.7% in 1995, to 75.3% in 1997, to
73.7% in 1999, and to 74% in 2001. Id.
64. Id. at 2; CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 57, at 2 tbl.1. The figures are in 2001 dollars
based on the Consumer Price Index Research Series. GRALL, supra note 5, at 2.
65. See supra Part I.A.
66. GRALL, supra note 5, at 2. In 2001, 6.9 million parents were due child support, but
only 3 million parents received the full amount due to them. Id.
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implement new and different enforcement techniques to increase child
support collection.
C. The Effects on Children and Parents
1. Financial Suffering
Notwithstanding the emotional upheaval endured by families of
divorce or separation, the financial strain placed on children and parents
as a result of the nonpayment of child support can be overwhelming.
There is a direct correlation between nonpayment of child support and
poverty.67 Nonpayment is particularly serious because child support can
make the difference between poverty and nonpoverty for some
families. 68  Children in families near the poverty line can easily fall
below the poverty line if child support payments are not made.69
Statistical evidence supports this conclusion. Twenty-nine percent
of all custodial mothers who did not receive child support payments fell
below the 2001 poverty line, while only 15% of those who received full
payment fell below the poverty line.70 The same variance held true for
custodial fathers.71
Employment and income derived from employment likewise
impacts poverty rates, 72 but income from child support may be more
valuable to a custodial parent than income from employment.73
Although the rate of poverty for custodial parents has declined ten
percentage points,74 the rate of employment for custodial parents has
climbed at almost the same rate.75 Increasing employment for custodial
67. See id. at 3.
68. LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 284
(1985).
69. Id.
70. GRALL, supra note 5, at 4. For custodial mothers who received partial payment,
25.5% had family income below the poverty line. Id.
71. Id. The family income of 22.8% of custodial fathers who did not receive child
support payments fell below the poverty line, while 10.8% of those who received full
payment fell below the poverty line. Id.
72. At least 55% of unemployed custodial parents lived in poverty in 2001, while only
7.8% of custodial parents working full-time and year-round lived in poverty. Id. at 3.
73. See infra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
74. GRALL, supra note 5, at 3 (reporting that poverty rates declined from 33.3% in
1993 to 23.4% in 2001). The rate of poverty for custodial parent families is four times
higher than the rate for married couple families with related children. Id.
75. Id. at 3 fig.1 (reporting that employment rates climbed from 75.3% of custodial
parents employed in 1993 to 83.4% in 2001). The percentage of custodial parents employed
in full-time, year-round jobs increased from 45.6% to 55.3% during the eight-year span.
Id.
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parents translates to less time with the children and additional child care
costs, making child support dollars more valuable than employment
income. In fact, custodial mothers had a significant increase in full-time,
year-round employment, jumping from 40.9% in 1993 to 52.3% in
2001.76 To the extent that child support, rather than full-time, year-
round employment, can lift families out of poverty, children may enjoy
the residual benefit of increased time and involvement by the custodial
parent.
In addition to statistical support, the day-to-day impact on
children--even those above the poverty line-has been documented.
Drs. Judith Wallerstein and Joan Kelly interviewed parents and
children in sixty divorcing families in California during the initial six
weeks of separation, one year following, and again five years later.77
These families came from a relatively affluent community and even
though some children received child support on a fairly regular basis,
75% of the custodial mothers reported a decline in their standard of
living.78
After divorce, custodial mothers assumed the dual role of wage
earner and head of household and ultimately spent less time with their
children. 79 Because of the financial strain on the custodial parent due to
the divorce and the nonpayment of child support, children were forced
to relocate and change schools. Within the first three years of the
separation, "almost two-thirds of the [children] had changed their ...
residence, and ... [some] had moved three or more times."80 Many of
these moves were related to financial factors-a new job, the need for
less expensive housing, or more preferable child care arrangements. s
The children's stability was shaken because the financial picture of the
family had changed, which resulted in disruptions in the child's home
and school environments.82
Even if child support is paid timely and in full, the economic
consequences to a child's life can be startling. Failure to receive all or
76. Id. Custodial fathers who worked full time, year round increased from 70.2% in 1993
to 71.7% in 2001, with a peak in 1997 of 76.9%. Id.
77. JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN BERLIN KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP:
How CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE 320, 332-33 (1980).
78. Id. at 23.
79. See id. at 25 (noting that children spent less time with their fathers as well).
80. Id. at 183.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 41-43. For example, after divorce or separation, "children were more likely
to eat by themselves, to make their own lunches for school, ... [or] put themselves to bed"
because the parent was working full time, had school commitments, or had new social
engagements. Id. at 42.
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some child support places the child and the custodial parent in a more
difficult situation-struggling to stay above the poverty line or being
unable to do the same types of activities to which the child was
accustomed in an intact family. Financial strain can also lead to
emotional suffering, yet another consequence of nonpayment.
2. Emotional Suffering and Development
The emotional suffering that children endure as a result of the
nonpayment of support often goes unspoken. Aside from enduring the
separation of their mother and father, many children experience anger
and resentment because one parent is not providing financial help to the
other parent for their care. Wallerstein and Kelly found in their study
that children often compared the economic situation in their mother's
and father's households.83 When the mother and children experienced
downward economic mobility and the father did not, the children
exhibited a sense of deprivation and anger.' 4
Not only is child support important for the emotional well-being
of children, but it may also have a distinct impact on their
development. Various studies have concluded that children of
disrupted marriages achieve greater academic success with increased
levels of child support.85 In fact, statistically, child support income
creates greater benefits for children than other types of income."
According to several separate analyses of data compiled from surveys
of children, the ability of single mothers to receive child support from
noncustodial fathers measurably impacts the cognitive development
of their children.87
83. Id. at 231.
84. See id. (adding that this created additional conflict between the mother and
father).
85. See John W. Graham et al., The Effects of Child Support on Educational
Attainment, in CHILD SUPPORT AND CHILD WELL-BEING 317, 343 (Irwin Garfinkel et al.
eds., 1994) (concluding that child support had a greater impact on academic success than
other types of income); Virginia W. Knox & Mary Jo Bane, Child Support and Schooling,
in CHILD SUPPORT AND CHILD WELL-BEING, supra, at 287, 302-07 (finding a correlation
between the level of child support and the length of time in school, controlling for income
level and receipt of welfare).
86. Sarah S. McLanahan et al., Child Support Enforcement and Child Well-Being:
Greater Security or Greater Conflict?, in CHILD SUPPORT AND CHILD WELL-BEING, supra
note 85, at 239, 253 (finding a positive correlation between child support and grade point
averages); Daniela Del Boca & Christopher J. Flinn, Expenditure Decisions of Divorced
Mothers and Income Composition, 29 J. HUM. RESOURCES 742, 760 (1994) (concluding
that child support income is associated with greater degrees of expenditures on children).
87. Laura M. Argys et al., The Impact of Child Support on Cognitive Outcomes of
Young Children, 35 DEMOGRAPHY 159, 159-60 (1998) (citing several empirical studies);
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One study found increases in grade point averages and
reductions in behavioral problems as a result of child support
received.88 Another study found evidence that child support has
positive effects on achievement test scores, over and above the effects
of the total family income.89 Still another study found that child
support was positively related to more years in school, after
controlling for income level and receipt of welfare.9"
The importance of child support dollars cannot be understated
because it has distinct effects when compared to other methods of
income, such as employment by the custodial parent or government
assistance.9 First, child support income may improve a child's
material well-being because mothers may feel obligated to spend it
directly on purchases for the child.92 Second, child support payments
may improve the payor parent-child relationship by increasing the
custodial parent's willingness to let the other parent spend time with
the child or by having important symbolic meaning to the child.93
Third, child support, unlike other forms of income, comes with no
negative consequence.9 4 Other types of income, such as government
assistance, may create a stigma that affects the custodial parent and
the child's outlook, and employment by the custodial parent, while
providing a role model, may take away from time with the child and
result in poor child care situations. 95
A child's well-being, aside from his or her financial needs, is
affected by the failure of a parent to pay support. Children are aware
that support is being provided by one parent, particularly when it goes
unpaid.96 Failure to support a child can lead to resentment of the
Virginia W. Knox, The Effects of Child Support Payments on Developmental Outcomes for
Elementary School-Age Children, 31 J. HUM. RESOURCES 816, 819-20 (1996).
88. McLanahan et al., supra note 86, at 253.
89. Knox, supra note 87, at 819. Like other forms of income, additional child support
also improved the level of cognitive stimulation available in the home environment,
however achievement test scores were isolated and improved as a result of child support
income alone. Id. To assure that the effects of child support are different than those of
other income sources, the author used three methods to control for unmeasured
heterogeneity among families: (1) accounting for the average number of visitation days
shared annually; (2) controlling for characteristics of the local economy; and
(3) determining whether local variation influences income and payment for those families
in which the fathers were never absent during the previous five years. Id.
90. Knox & Bane, supra note 85, at 302-07.
91. Knox, supra note 87, at 817.
92. Id. (citing Del Boca & Flinn, supra note 86).
93. Id. at 818 (citing McLanahan et al., supra note 86).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 77, at 231.
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nonpaying parent and feelings of unworthiness by the child. A rejection
of the child's needs by the parent can translate to feelings of rejection by
the child. While the custodial parent and other adult caregivers will
attempt to mitigate any effects that nonpayment will have on the child,
finding ways to cause the noncustodian to pay will offer greater, long-
term benefits.
II. THE PROBLEM: WHY PARENTS DON'T PAY
Developing a successful program first requires an examination of
the primary causes of nonpayment. Previous studies have identified
several recurring reasons that parents fail to pay.97 By isolating each
reason, appropriate solutions can be considered, keeping in mind that
these reasons may interplay and overlap. In the literature, researchers
consistently articulate four reasons why parents fail to pay child support:
inability to pay, lack of access to and relationship with the child, poor
enforcement, and psychological reasons related to feelings about the ex-
spouse and attitude about the child support award.98 Each will be
addressed in turn.
A. Inability To Pay
Some believe that failure to pay results from inability to pay.9 9 In
the most comprehensive research on this question, Lenore Weitzman
conducted a ten-year study of families in California and determined that
inability to pay was not a primary reason for failing to pay child
97. See generally DAVID L. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY: THE
ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT 129-30 (1979) (suggesting that the remarriage of
either parent may result in nonpayment); Sumati N. Dubey, A Study of Reasons for Non-
Payment of Child Support by Non-Custodial Parents, 22 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 115
(1995) (concluding that fathers fail to pay because of lack of money and no visitation
rights); Deena Mandell, Fathers Who Don't Pay Child Support: Hearing Their Voices, 23
J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 85 (1995) (conducting a study to provide insight into why
fathers fail to pay); Raymond I. Parnas & Sherry Cermak, Rethinking Child Support, 22
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 759 (1989) (suggesting that the family court process contributes to
nonpayment).
98. Additional reasons have been raised for nonpayment: socioeconomic reasons
related to new children in a marriage, occupation of the payor, length of the marriage, age
of the parents and children, and whether the parties had a marital agreement. See
CHAMBERS, supra note 97, at 109-12; Parnas & Cermak, supra note 97, at 762.
99. See Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility
and the Public Interest, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 166, 175 (Stephen D.
Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990) (stating that "large numbers of defaulting fathers
do not have (and never had) the missing money").
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support.'0° Weitzman considered the percentage of a father's income
used to pay child support and found that it was rare for a court to order
more than 25% of a father's net income in child support. 1°1 She also
analyzed the U.S. Department of Labor's budget standards for a family
of four and concluded that approximately three-fourths of California
fathers had the ability to pay the amount of court-ordered child support
"without a substantial reduction in their standard of living."' 2 Indeed,
when divorced women and men in her study were asked "Can you (or
your ex-husband) afford to pay the child support the court ordered?,"
80% of the women and 90% of the men said yes. 10 3
Weitzman also looked at the relationship between compliance and
the father's income. If lack of ability to pay is a true cause for
nonpayment, then fathers with lower incomes should have higher rates
of noncompliance. Her data, however, showed that fathers earning
between $30,000 and $50,000 per year were just as likely to avoid child
support payments as those earning less than $10,000 per year."
Conclusions from other studies support Weitzman's position that
inability to pay is not a primary cause for nonpayment. In one study,
the author concluded that nonresident fathers could afford to pay more
child support because they spend on average only 7% of their income
on child support."5 Additionally, a group of Canadian researchers
100. WEITZMAN, supra note 68, at 295. Indeed, Weitzman concluded that there is
normally enough money to permit payment of significantly higher awards than are being
made. Id.
101. Id. at 267, 273. She found an inverse relationship between the percentage of a
father's income awarded in child support and the father's income level. Id. at 266. Lower-
income men were required to pay a greater proportion of their incomes in child support,
but higher-income men were more likely to pay alimony as well as child support. Id.
When comparing the total amount of support (child support plus alimony), there was less
of a difference between high- and low-income fathers. Id.
102. Id. at 274. She concluded that 61% of California fathers would be able to comply
fully with court-ordered child support and still live above the high standard budget as set
forth by the U.S. Department of Labor. Id. An additional 12% of fathers would be in full
compliance and would be able to live above the lower standard budget. Id.
103. Id. at 276.
104. Id. at 296. Weitzman considered a father's post-divorce income and found that
27% of fathers whose annual income was less than $10,000 did not pay or paid irregularly
and 29% of those earning between $30,000 and $50,000 per year did not pay or paid
irregularly. Id. Only 8% of fathers who earned over $50,000 failed to pay or paid
irregularly. Id. at 296 tbl.25. See also JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE,
SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE 136
(1989) ("Wealthier men do not have a better record of child support.").
105. Elaine Sorensen, A National Profile of Nonresident Fathers and Their Ability To
Pay Child Support, 59 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 785, 792-93 (1997). Nonresident fathers
were defined as fathers of biological or adopted children under age eighteen who do not
live with them most of the time. Id. at 786.
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found that low income could be associated with irregular payment but
failed to find a relationship between low income and nonpayment.
116
Although inability to pay was the second most common reason given by
parents for not paying child support, an analysis of their (lack of)
disposable income showed that irregular payment, rather than
nonpayment, was the result.10 7 The priority that the noncustodian gave
to the child support payments, rather than income, affected his ability to
pay.10 8
A study conducted by David Chambers found rates of payment
statistically similar for men at low and high income levels due, in large
part, to stringent enforcement practices."° Even when "the financial
pinch" was severe, men with little income would rather pay than go to
jail."' Finally, in a smaller study conducted in one California county,
even though payor parents with lower incomes were more likely to be in
default than their higher-income counterparts, the authors concluded
that fiscal mismanagement was likely the reason for nonpayment."'
Because lower-income payors are left with a small pool of disposable
income, poor money management can more readily affect the payment
of child support."2 Further, psychological or pragmatic factors may
cause a parent to give other financial obligations a higher priority than
the support obligation. 13 The payor may be angry at the ex-spouse or
may be concerned about paying his bills, thereby causing his
commitment to pay child support to falter. 4
Support orders today are the result of careful calculations by
judges, attorneys, and the parties.'15 In every jurisdiction, judges are
bound to follow child support schedules, and judges cannot deviate
from the schedule without adequate oral or written support. 116 The
106. 1 CANADIAN INST. FOR RESEARCH, MATRIMONIAL SUPPORT FAILURES 20-22
(1981).
107. Id. at 21-22.
108. Id. at 22.
109. CHAMBERS, supra note 97, at 161-62.
110. Id. at 162.




115. For a review of state child support formulas and guidelines, see Jane C. Venohr &
Robert G. Williams, The Implementation and Periodic Review of State Child Support
Guidelines, 33 FAM. L.Q. 7 (1999).
116. See JUDITH AREEN, FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 767 (3d ed. 1992)
(noting that although no two states have the same standards, all states have adopted child
support guidelines). Some states require oral or written reasons before a judge can
deviate from the guidelines. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-320 (2007) (requiring a
written finding that application of the guidelines are inappropriate); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
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parent's ability to pay is of primary importance, and an amount of child
support is determined based on a uniform set of criteria. 17 As a result,
support awards are manageable for the parent paying child support, and
inability to pay should not be a primary reason for nonpayment.
Rather, poor money management and psychological issues are likely the
underlying causes for nonpayment.
A Child Support Savings Account could alleviate budgeting and
money management concerns by providing an automatic transfer into
the account. A payor parent's disposable income would not include
amounts needed to satisfy the child support award. If parents are not
placing priority on the child support owed, the decision of when and if
to pay would not be in their hands. Additionally, with a tax benefit, the
child support award could free up more dollars for the child. Even if a
parent is angry at the ex-spouse, preventing interaction over financial
matters-a source of disagreement in and out of marriage-can only
benefit the child and his personal relationship with both parents.
B. Access to and Relationship with the Child
As another reason for the nonpayment of child support, parents
report not feeling the same connection with the child because of the
decreased time spent with the child."' Remarriage of the mother or
father, or both, often contributes to this feeling because one parent
believes the step-parent has assumed the role of caregiver." 9 Data from
the U.S. Census Bureau support this belief. Of those custodial parents
who had arrangements with the other parent for joint custody or
visitation, 77.1%, or approximately three-fourths, received either full or
partial child support from the other parent.20  Of those custodial
parents who did not have joint custody or visitation arrangements, only
55.8%, or approximately one-half, received some child support from the
§ 9:315.1 (2000 & Supp. 2007) (establishing a rebuttable presumption for the guidelines
and requiring written or oral reasons); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458-C:4 (LexisNexis 2007)
(requiring either a written or specific finding of special circumstances to deviate from the
guidelines); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2 (2004 & Supp. 2006) (requiring written reasons to
overcome a rebuttable presumption in favor of application of the guidelines).
117. See AREEN, supra note 116, at 763-67.
118. See CHAMBERS, supra note 97, at 127-28; Judith A. Seltzer et al., Will Child
Support Enforcement Increase Father-Child Contact and Parental Conflict After
Separation?, in FATHERS UNDER FIRE: THE REVOLUTION IN CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT 157, 158-59 (Irwin Garfinkel et al. eds., 1998).
119. See CHAMBERS, supra note 97, at 129-30.
120. GRALL, supra note 5, at 8.
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other parent.121 Parents with more access to the child may establish a
stronger bond with the child, leading to higher rates of compliance. 22
Other studies have echoed a relationship between custody and
nonpayment of child support. For example, in one study, 75% of
payees who shared joint legal and physical custody with the other
parent received court-ordered child support in full. 123 When joint legal,
maternal physical custody was awarded, only 64% of payees received
full payment, as compared to 46% when sole legal and physical custody
was awarded. 124 Again, less time with the child leads to less payment.
One author has suggested that the emotional adjustment of being a
parent after divorce but lacking equal access to the children leads to
stress and creates a lack of incentive to pay child support."z
Because custody inherently involves different emotional and
psychological responses for individual families, it is difficult to isolate a
specific custodial arrangement that is a direct cause of nonpayment of
child support. Rather, the payor's access to the child-or perceived
access to the child-may affect his desire to pay. To encourage
meaningful relationships between noncustodians and their children,
both from a financial and psychological perspective, the federal
government implemented a program entitled "Grants to States for
Access and Visitation.' ' 126  States were directed to provide services
including mediation, counseling, parental education, development of
parenting plans, visitation when it must be monitored or supervised, and
121. Id.
122. See Robert H. Mnookin & Eleanor Maccoby, Facing the Dilemmas of Child
Custody, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 54,76 (2002).
123. Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Child Custody, Child Support Arrangements
and Child Support Payment Patterns, 36 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 49, 52 (1985). This study has
been criticized. See Nancy Polikoff, Custody and Visitation: Their Relationship to
Establishing and Enforcing Support, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 274, 274 (1985)
(concluding from that study's data that no conclusion could be reached).
124. Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 123, at 52-53; see also Parnas & Cermak, supra
note 97, at 771 (finding that payors who were granted joint physical custody produced the
best payment); W.P.C. Phear et al., An Empirical Study of Custody Agreements: Joint
Versus Sole Legal Custody, 11 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 419, 432 (1983) (finding that sole
custody cases returned to court most often over nonpayment of child support).
125. Neil J. Salkind, The Father-Child Postdivorce Relationship and Child Support, in
THE PARENTAL CHILD-SUPPORT OBLIGATION: RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND SOCIAL
POLICY 173, 177 (Judith Cassetty ed., 1983). But see WEITZMAN, supra note 68, at 297
(finding no correlation between compliance and complaints about visitation and arguing
that men who do not comply with child support use visitation as an excuse as to why they
are failing to do something which is morally right); Chuck Shively, Examining the Link
Between Access to Children and Payment of Support, 11 DIVORCE LITIG. 85, 89 (1999)
(citing a study that found that increases in visitation have no effect on payment of child
support).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 669b (2000).
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a neutral place for exchange time with the child to support and facilitate
noncustodial parents' access to and visitation with their children." 7 In
2003, states provided access and visitation services to 70,000 parents,
and states reported that nearly 26,000 noncustodial parents increased
their parenting time with their children. 1
8
State legislatures have also recognized that equal access to both
parents produces fiscal and psychological benefits to the child. States
have passed laws articulating a preference for joint or shared custody
and adjusting the amount of child support owed when the child spends a
significant amount of time with the noncustodian. For example, in
Louisiana, the law is express that physical custody of the children should
be shared equally when feasible and in the best interest of the child. 129
Furthermore, when a child spends at least 20% of the year with the
payor parent, the court can adjust the amount of child support paid to
the payee during that time.130  Other states have a presumption that
joint custody is in the best interest of the child' and recognize
downward adjustments in the amount of child support owed for time
spent with the noncustodian. 32 Not only may an increase in visitation
decrease the amount of child support owed, but the additional time
spent with the child may strengthen the parent-child bond and increase
the amount of child support paid.
127. Id. Since its passage, $10 million per year has been appropriated for the states, to
which each state must provide a 10% match of the federal grant amount. Id.
128. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., PRELIMINARY DATA; CHILD ACCESS AND VISITATION GRANTS: STATE
PROFILES (FY 2003) § 2 chart A, chart J (2004), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/cse/pubs/2004/reports/prelim-access-visitation.grants#sect2. Each state reports
to the Office of Child Support Enforcement but has discretion to decide on what services
to provide, organizations to be funded, geographic areas to be covered, and persons to be
served to meet the purposes of the program. Id. § 1.
129. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:335(A)(2)(b) (2000); see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
132 (1999) (articulating a preference for joint custody if the parents fail to agree to a
custody arrangement or if the arrangement is not in the best interest of the child).
130. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.8(E)(1)-(2) (2000 & Supp. 2007). In determining
the amount of credit given, the court must consider the amount of time the child spends
with the payor parent, the increase in financial burden to the payor parent, the decrease in
financial burden to the payee parent, and the best interest of the child. Id. § 9:315.8(E)(3).
131. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13 (West 2006 & Supp. 2007) ("The court shall
order that the parental responsibility for a minor child be shared by both parents unless
the court finds that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child.");
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1 (West 2003) ("There shall be a presumption that joint custody
is in the best interests of a child in an initial custody determination.").
132. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-19-103(g) (West 1999); see also Marygold S. Melli
& Patricia R. Brown, The Economics of Shared Custody: Developing an Equitable
Formula for Dual Residence, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 543, 560-69 (1994) (analyzing the various
formulae used to give credit for joint custody).
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Using a Child Support Savings Account will not directly affect one
parent's access to or relationship with the child, but it may change the
overall family dynamic. Without challenges over money, the parents
can focus on the personal needs of the child. To the extent that
custodial arrangements influence the payment of child support, state
and federal laws encourage joint custody and- provide monetary
accommodations for parents who spend considerable time with their
children. As more parents enjoy equal parenting over their children,
the result should be higher levels of child support collection from
involved parents.
C. Poor Enforcement
Evidence suggests that noncustodians who live in communities with
poor enforcement practices are more likely to forgo child support
payments than those who live in communities with successful
enforcement schemes. In David Chambers's study, counties with the
best payment levels required that payments be made directly to the
court with a threat of jail time in the case of nonpayment. 13 3 Chambers
found that counties that jailed men were only successful if they
implemented a "self-starting" system, under which the payor made
payments directly to the court so that court personnel could monitor
compliance.1" If the payor missed a few payments or was in arrears, the
court would send reminders, prodding letters, and warning notices,
without any intervention by the payee.'35
Chambers also found that a high probability of jail time for
continuously delinquent fathers increased the level of compliance.
According to Chambers, the threat of jail time was successful because of
the self-starting enforcement practice.136  Imprisoning delinquent
payors, however, prevents the parent from providing the support
needed for the child and frustrates the parent-child relationship.'37 The
ongoing economic consequences of having been convicted may further
impede the parent's ability to provide for the child and may lead to
resentment of the other parent for bringing him to justice, further
frustrating the family relationship.'38  Whether the threat of
133. CHAMBERS, supra note 97, at 90.
134. Id. at 90-91.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS
1090 (3d ed. 1990) (noting that imprisonment may frustrate an already fragile family
dynamic). For an interesting historical perspective on child support, see Hansen, supra
note 6, at 1133-50.
138. KRAUSE, supra note 137, at 1090.
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incarceration-without actual jail time-could be enough to increase
compliance is less clear.'39
Scholars do agree, however, that direct wage deduction provides a
successful approach to ensuring payment.1 40 When the order for child
support is signed, the court will order the payor's employer to withhold
an amount from the payor's wages to be paid directly to the court or to
the payee. Although income withholding has been "required" for
support orders entered after 1994, a parent can avoid immediate
withholding by demonstrating "good cause" or by having the other
parent agree to forgo any withholding.'41
In practice, wage assignments are underused. In Weitzman's study,
family law judges in California, Florida, and New York City routinely
failed to issue wage assignments even when they were mandatory.14 2
Some of those judges reported that they disapproved of the law, stating
that it "took away [judicial] discretion" or "could jeopardize the
[payor's] job.' ' 143 A study from Wisconsin examined ten counties that
required routine wage withholding and concluded that the strategy
could increase child support collection between 11% and 30%.' These
figures could be impacted further by removing the stigma of a wage
withholding order issued by a court and allowing the noncustodial
parent to elect to have his income withheld.
Interestingly, most men subject to wage assignments preferred
their use. One man explained that with a wage assignment, "'I have
what I have.' "145 Wage assignments eliminated budgeting decisions and
made paying child support less painful. 46 Several men also explained
that "having the child support deducted from [their] wages eliminated
139. For example, Judge Rosemary Barkett of West Palm Beach, Florida, "found that
the most effective means of securing compliance was to sentence noncomplying fathers to
jail, but to delay the incarceration if they paid the arrearage." WEITZMAN, supra note 68,
at 299.
140. See CHAMBERS, supra note 97, at 258-61 (discussing advantages of a mandatory
system of garnishment at the time of the initial child support order); WEITZMAN, supra
note 68, at 293, 298, 302.
141. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(a)(8) (West 2003 & Supp. 2006).
142. WEITZMAN, supra note 68, at 302-03. Wage assignments were mandatory in
California if the parent had not paid support for two months. Id.
143. Id. at 303.
144. Irwin Garfinkel & Marieka M. Klawitter, The Effect of Routine Income
Withholding of Child Support Collections, 9 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 155, 155, 168
(1990).
145. WEITZMAN, supra note 68, at 305.
146. Id.
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the resistance" from new wives or girlfriends to pay the "ex. ' 147 No
decisions have to be made; child support is automatic.
A Child Support Savings Accounts would capitalize on this
phenomenon without requiring judicial intervention. In fact, a CSSA
offers more benefits than a simple wage assignment-the tax savings
incentivize payor parents to withhold child support from their wages. If
strict enforcement causes a higher level of compliance, then a CSSA
provides the same causal relationship without the negative repercussion.
Rather, the CSSA provides a positive motivation to the paying parent,
and the benefit of paying child support is shared among the family-the
child, the parent receiving the funds, and the payor parent.
D. Psychological Reasons
Parents also resist paying child support for several psychological
reasons: they believe that the payments are not being used to benefit
the child, but for the parent and her new spouse and children; they are
angry or resentful toward the parent and her new life; or they lack
understanding of the court's method of awarding child support and have
refused to accept it.148 The psychological effects of divorce cannot be
understated. In Chambers's study, he concluded that the payor's
attitude is one of the most important factors in payment. 149  He
explained, "If recollection of the separation is painful, the writing of a
check is a weekly stab from the past. One avoids pain by not thinking
about payments." 150
The resentment and lack of control over the funds makes some
parents resistant to paying child support. One Canadian researcher
explained:
Child support is like the tax system in that non-custodial
parents do not like the idea of having their income taken from
147. Id.
148. See LESLIE HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY LAW 470 (1996) (suggesting that
noncustodial parents resist paying child support because the money "isn't really going to
the kids"); WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note 104, at 136 (noting that the new lives
of ex-spouses, the failure to pay child support, and the belief that child support is being
used for the selfish purposes of the ex-spouse all fuel anger); David M. Betson, Fair
Shares: Meeting the Financial Needs of Children After Divorce, in CHILD SUPPORT: THE
GUIDELINE OPTIONS 135, 139 (1994) (noting that parents resent paying child support that
improves the standard of living of a former spouse).
149. CHAMBERS, supra note 97, at 73-75, 107. Chambers looked at the frequency that
men attended a Friends of the Court meeting before the divorce process began. Those
men who did not attend the meeting paid fewer support awards than those who attended.
Id. at 112-13.
150. Id. at 73.
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them and not having control over how it can be spent.... [T]he
benefits of the child support payments are diminished in the
eyes of the non-custodial parent by the knowledge that the
payments are making the custodial parent better off.5 '
Resentment will fester when a parent believes that his "ex" is using
the money "for her own selfish or frivolous purposes.' 15 2 At least one
scholar, Judith McMullen, has recognized parental concerns that child
support is not being spent on the child and has suggested the use of a
child support trust to alleviate this concern.'53 Professor McMullen
found that "lack of ability to assure that [child support] funds are used
for the children is one reason for nonpayment."'5 4 She argues that any
fear that the children are not receiving the benefits of the money can be
alleviated by using a child support trust.155
In the past, child support trusts have been used when parents act
irresponsibly; for example, when the paying parent is in arrears or the
payee is not using the funds for the support of the child. 5 6 Some courts,
however, have refused to impose a trust on child support payments
because it interferes with the ability of the custodial parent to make
decisions on behalf of the child and creates an additional burden on the
custodian to provide receipts or expenses to the trustee to obtain the
funds.'57 Recognizing some judicial reluctance, Professor McMullen
151. Betson, supra note 148, at 139.
152. WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note 104, at 136; see HARRIS ET AL., supra
note 148, at 470.
153. Judith G. McMullen, Prodding the Payor and Policing the Payee: Using Child
Support Trusts To Create an Incentive for Prompt Payment of Support Obligations, 32
NEW ENG. L. REV. 439, 464 (1998). Professor McMullen distributed a survey to family
lawyers who attended the American Inns of Court meeting in 1997. Id. at 452 n.104.
Twenty-eight family lawyers were asked, "When you have represented persons who are in
arrears on their child support payments, what reasons do they give for their failure to
pay?" Twenty of the twenty-eight respondents indicated that one reason was "[c]oncern
that the support money [would] not actually be spent on the children," second only to the
"[flack of money or financial difficulties," which was selected by twenty-six of the twenty-
eight respondents. Id.
154. Id. at 451-52.
155. Id. at 453.
156. Id. at 464. Child support trusts have also been used when the "paying parent has a
variable income," "[w]here the payor is financially able to establish a trust fund to cover
future educational expenses," and when the parties agree to enter into a trust. Id. at 454-
55.
157. See Cameron v. Cameron, 562 N.W.2d 126, 134-35 (Wis. 1997) (finding that the
court of appeals erroneously upheld a trust in the absence of evidence of consent or that
the custodial parent unwisely managed the money); Winkler v. Winkler, 2005 WI App 100,
699 N.W.2d 652, 662-63 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005) (applying Cameron to uphold the trial
court's refusal to establish a trust); Resong v. Vier, 459 N.W.2d 591, 595 (Wis. Ct. App.
1990) (establishing a "best interests of the child" standard for application of trusts).
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argues that child support trusts should be used more frequently, as a
needed incentive for parents to pay with the assurance that the
payments will benefit the child. 5 ' If the trust is properly structured, she
argues custodial parents would not be stripped of their "autonomy or
control over spending decisions."' 59 An interest-bearing checking or
savings account could comprise the trust, and a suitable family member
or friend could serve as the trustee."6 According to McMullen, even
though a custodial parent would have to present documentation to
collect funds from the trust, no approval would be needed from either
the trustee or the paying parent. 61
Likewise, a Child Support Savings Account can remedy concerns
over use of the funds without much administrative expense and without
placing any limitation on the custodian's autonomy. Unlike an
individual trust with individual trustees, a CSSA would be administered
by a financial institution for hundreds of payors. Because financial
institutions already have the systems in place to operate these types of
accounts, the expense and administrative burden on the parties would
be minimal. 62 Additionally, using a CSSA would not hamper the
decisionmaking authority of the custodian. Unlike an individual trust, a
custodian would not have to provide documentation for expenses; the
CSSA's automatic recordkeeping function would provide the necessary
detail if the custodian's choices were challenged.
The payor's attitude about paying child support should improve if
he is paying it to a financial institution or if it is being withheld from his
wages. The paying parent will no longer feel a complete loss of control
over how the money is being spent. A spending record could help
ensure that the money is being spent on the child, and the custodial
parent will retain unencumbered decisionmaking authority over the
funds. The payor's attitude should change without sacrificing the
autonomy of the payee or imposing administrative burdens.
Whether a parent fails to pay child support due to inferior money
management skills, unsatisfactory time spent with the child, poor local
enforcement, or damaging feelings about the other parent, a CSSA-can
offer an incentive that may pacify a nonpaying parent's reason for
noncompliance. Answering the question of why parents do not pay can
158. McMullen, supra note 153, at 470.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 475.
161. Id. at 477.
162. Telephone Interview with Dana Moore, Senior Vice President, J.P. Morgan/Chase
Bank, in New Orleans, La. (Aug. 14, 2006).
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provide ideas to improve collection, but as always, the devil is in the
details.
III. A SOLUTION: A CHILD SUPPORT SAVINGS ACCOUNT
A Child Support Savings Account provides a creative alternative to
improve the payment and collection of child support. Both parents will
benefit from incentives for the prompt payment of child support, and
ultimately a child of a divorced or single-family home will reap the
reward. The results from traditional forms of enforcement have waned.
The time has come to introduce a new mechanism to increase child
support collection, keeping the best interest of the child as the principal
goal.
A. The Logistics of a CSSA
The first step in creating a CSSA would be state-sponsored
legislation authorizing payment of child support into an account at a
qualified financial institution. In most cases, after the parties litigate
child support or enter into a consent judgment, the noncustodial parent
pays his share of child support to the custodial parent, generally on a
monthly basis. If the state is seeking payment of child support, the
noncustodial parent pays directly to the court or state agency charged
with collection of child support. 63 The state agency or court performs a
recordkeeping function and then forwards the monies to the custodial
parent." In either event, a court can mandate that a portion of the
noncustodian's earnings be withheld by his employer and paid to the
custodial parent or state agency. 65
When using a CSSA, the noncustodial, payor parent would
contribute his monthly child support by authorizing his employer to
withhold funds and deposit them directly into the CSSA. If a payor was
self-employed, he could contribute directly into the account.1 66  To
access the funds, the custodial parent would receive a debit card,
sponsored by a widely accepted provider, such as Visa or MasterCard,
163. In order to comply with federal law, a state must offer "assistance in establishing
and enforcing [child] support orders" and must "initiate proceedings to establish and
collect child support awards." 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 652(h), 654(4) (West 2003 & Supp. 2006).
164. If the payee is receiving public assistance through TANF, the support is used to
reimburse the state for assistance already paid to the parent for the child. Id. § 657.
165. See 42 U.S.C. § 654b (2000) (mandating that states have automated procedures for
the collection and disbursement of child support payments).
166. Although there is a noteworthy benefit to having an employer withhold funds
from the noncustodian's wages, CSSAs should also be available to parents who are self-
employed or whose employer does not perform this service.
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which could be used for purchases for the child. The custodial parent
could also request checks to be drawn from the account to
accommodate payments to schools or other noncredit-accepting
businesses. Each time the custodial parent used the CSSA card, the
account would be debited for the specified amount. Simultaneously, a
record would be created for every transaction.167
An additional element of the CSSA debit card could be borrowed,
in part, from the nationwide food stamp program. Currently, food
stamps in all states are distributed via an "electronic benefit card"
similar to a debit card."6 Although the card does not carry a Visa or
MasterCard logo, it functions similarly to a debit card and immediately
debits the account holder's food stamp allowance. The card also
contains technology that prevents the cardholder from purchasing
alcohol or cigarettes with the card.169 The CSSA debit card could
likewise prohibit the purchase of alcohol or cigarettes with the card, to
protect not only the noncustodial parent but, in particular, the child.
Ordinarily, when a custodial parent receives her share of child
support, she deposits the check into her account or cashes the check.
The money is required to be used for the benefit of the child. The
noncustodial parent receives no accounting of how the funds are spent
unless he lives in one of the eleven states that allow noncustodians to
request an accounting of child support paid. 7° Several of these states,
however, permit an accounting only when good cause is shown.'7 1 In
167. The statement of monthly transactions would be available only to the custodial
parent. The noncustodial parent would be entitled to view the statement only in the event
that an accounting had been ordered. See infra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
168. 7 U.S.C. § 2016(i) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); 7 C.F.R. § 274.12 (2006) (setting forth
rules and regulations for the approval, implementation, and operation of the electronic
benefit transfer).
169. See 7 U.S.C. § 2012(g)(1) (2000) (excluding alcohol and tobacco products from the
definition of food).
170. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-14-103 (2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-115(3)(b)(III)
(2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 518 (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(1)(a) (West 2006
& Supp. 2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-16-9-6 (LexisNexis 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:312 (2000 & Supp. 2007); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.342 (West 2003); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 42-364(6) (2004 & Supp. 2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105(1)(c) (2005); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-45-7.20 (2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.23.050(2)(a)(ii) (West 2005).
Alabama has authorized an accounting under the specific facts of a case. See McDuffie v.
Holland, 690 So. 2d 386, 390 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
171. In Delaware, Indiana, Louisiana, Missouri, and Washington, "good cause" or a
"proper showing of necessity" must be shown before an accounting is ordered. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 518; IND. CODE ANN. § 31-16-9-6; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:312; MO.
ANN. STAT. § 452.342; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.23.050(2)(a)(ii). In Nebraska, the
standard is "abusive disregard" of child support. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364(6). For a
more comprehensive discussion of the accounting statutes, see Laura W. Morgan, Whose
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many circumstances, the noncustodian may be disgruntled because he
paid the child's mother-no longer a trustworthy spouse or
companion-without any guarantee that the money will be spent on his
child. The debit card associated with a CSSA would automatically
record the transactions as money is spent. Even though the payor
would not be entitled to see the record of transactions, 72 his concerns
would be eased knowing that a record exists-which is not currently the
case-and that his child support could not be used to purchase adult
items, such as alcohol or cigarettes.
The custodial parent may face trepidation when collecting the
support check as well. Often, custodial parents must plead for the
child's money. Without an income assignment order that requires an
employer to withhold income to pay the custodial parent or the state
agency, the custodial parent must deal with the other parent on a
monthly basis. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, only 33.8% of
child support payments are made using an income assignment order,
and 31.7% of payments are made to the other parent.'73 Replacing
payments made to the other parent with automatic deductions from
wages will result in less parental interaction about money and should
result in increased collection.
Voluntary wage assignments strike an appropriate balance for
noncustodians. On the one hand, the noncustodian gains control by
choosing automatic wage assignment, rather than being forced to do so,
knowing that a spending record will exist. On the other hand (and more
important to the child), control over whether or when to make the
payment is taken away from the noncustodian. David Chambers
explained the propriety of wage assignments well:
Money Is It, Anyway? A Custodial Parent's (Non)Duty To Account for Child Support, 14
AM. J. FAM. L. 15 (2000).
172. Valid reasons exist for generally preventing the noncustodial/payor parent from
seeing a record of the custodial parent's expenditures. With the ability to view a record of
expenditures, the payor would have "inordinate control over everyday expenditures for
child support to the detriment of the custodial parent's decision-making authority."
Morgan, supra note 171, at 16. Courts would be burdened with supervising discontent
parents and intruding into the financial affairs of custodial parents. Id. at 18-20. Few
states allow the noncustodial parent to challenge child support expenditures, see supra
note 170, and this proposal does not suggest that payor parents should have a greater right
to view the custodian's expenditures. Rather, the CSSA will give the payor comfort
knowing that a spending record exists-if at some point it becomes necessary to
challenge-without giving the payor any additional rights to intrude into the financial
affairs of the other parent.
173. TIMOTHY S. GRALL, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
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[W]age assignment may remove some of the sting of paying.
Even the man inclined toward payment is subject to the
emotional turmoil of the divorce. Each week's payment, when
it requires an affirmative act by the father, may be invested with
symbolic content.... He may still feel some twinge when he
sees the deduction listed on his pay stub, but by then the deed is
done and he cannot act on his feeling by withholding payment
for that week.17
4
Using a CSSA will also assure that funds paid by the noncustodian
are immediately available. Having the funds immediately available to
the custodial parent is especially meaningful for those parents who rely
on the state agency for enforcement. Due to necessary recordkeeping
functions, the state office of child support enforcement may require
several days to collect, record, and forward the monies paid by the
payor parent to the custodian.7 5 This process prevents some custodial
parents from accessing the funds when they are needed.
Louisiana's Office of Family Support, in the wake of Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, realized the need to get child support to custodians
when they were no longer in the State and could not receive their child
support payments by mail.'76 As a result, Louisiana now offers custodial
parents a "stored value card," which operates similarly to the proposed
CSSA. 7 7 Payments made to the Office of Family Support are deposited
into the custodial parent's account and a debit card is provided to the
custodial parent."8 Custodial parents can access the funds no matter
where they relocate, and the funds are available as soon as they are
received by the Office of Family Support. 179
Like the stored value card, a CSSA would filter child support to the
custodial parent immediately. Using a CSSA, however, would eliminate
the need for state enforcement agencies to collect the child support
payments. Instead, the employer would deduct the amount owed in
child support from the noncustodian's wages and would deposit it into a
savings account with an associated debit card. Because employers are
accustomed to setting aside employee dollars for flexible spending
174. CHAMBERS, supra note 97, at 154.
175. Telephone Interview with Robbie Endrisi, Executive Dir., Child Support
Program, La. Office of Family Support, in Baton Rouge, La. (Aug. 8, 2006).
176. Id.
177. Currently, twenty-eight states offer a debit card for clients of the state agency and
eight more states are in the planning stages. Telephone Interview with Robin Rushton,
Dir., Div. of State and Tribal Sys., Fed. Office of Child Support Enforcement, in Wash.,
D.C. (Aug. 8, 2006).
178. Telephone Interview with Robbie Endrisi, supra note 175.
179. Id.
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accounts, a Child Support Savings Account should not require
additional resources. In fact, employers should welcome the use of
CSSAs, which may prevent the employer from being subject to an
income assignment order by a court. When employers are subject to an
order of the court, employers must comply or subject themselves to
contempt. By allowing employees to manage their child support
obligation without the need for court intervention, the employer as well
as the employee will be free of judicial oversight.
Using a CSSA will provide benefits to both parents that will in turn
benefit the child. Custodial parents will have immediate access to child
support dollars. Noncustodial parents will feel more secure knowing
that a record of transactions exists.' Additionally, child support dollars
will be deducted from the noncustodian's paycheck, thereby eliminating
the choice of whether or not to pay. The negative interplay and
emotion that occurs when the noncustodial parent delivers or mails the
monthly child support check to the custodial parent will disappear.
B. Accounts Similar to a CSSA Already Exist
Accounts like the proposed CSSA already exist to provide
assistance for health and dependent care expenses. Currently,
individuals can contribute money, at significant tax savings, into
accounts from which medical expenses or expenses for the care of a
dependent can be paid. Flexible Spending Accounts ("FSAs") are the
most common and allow an employee to fund, with his or her own pre-
tax earnings, an account that is later used to reimburse that employee
for medical or dependent care expenses. 8 ' Additionally, Health
Savings Accounts ("HSAs") are used for individuals who participate in
high-deductible health care plans and allow an individual to deposit
money into a tax-deductible account that can be used for medical
costs.' Because of the rising costs of health care and the need to assist
the ailing and the dependent, Congress created programs to earmark a
portion of an individual's earnings, at significant tax savings, for these
important purposes. Providing for a child of a broken home should
enjoy the same tax benefit.
Government-recognized savings accounts are not new to the
United States Code. Dependent care FSAs and health care FSAs are
provided by employers to their employees as a savings benefit to pay for
180. See 26 U.S.C. § 105 (2000) (health care FSA); id. § 129 (dependent care FSA).
181. See 26 U.S.C. § 223 (Supp. IV 2004) (establishing deduction for payments made to
HSAs). Contributions into the HSAs are tax deductible, any earnings in the account are tax
deferred, and qualified distributions are tax free. Id. § 223(a), (f).
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dependent or health care expenses.' 82 The employee's income does not
include amounts that are funneled into the FSA; therefore, the
employee does not pay income tax on these earnings. Funds
accumulate in the FSA, and the employee can seek reimbursement
from the account for qualified medical expenses or dependent care
expenses.8" From an administrative standpoint, the employer or a third
party maintains the funds and distributes money to the employee after
each expense is substantiated. 85 The one downside of a FSA account is
that funds that are not spent on qualified expenses by the end of the
calendar year are forfeited, the so-called "use-it-or-lose-it" rule.'86
An HSA is a similar savings vehicle that is available to individuals
who participate in high-deductible health plans. 87  Although the
premiums are low for high-deductible health plans, the deductibles can
be prohibitive. To encourage participation in private health insurance,
Congress authorized the creation of a trust to pay the qualified medical
expenses of participants in a high-deductible health plan. 188 Trustees of
the plan are generally financial institutions, which operate the account
like a general savings account with check-writing and debit card
functions. 189
182. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
183. 26 U.S.C. § 129(a)(1) (2000) ("Gross income of an employee does not include
amounts paid or incurred by the employer for dependent care assistance .... "); id.
§ 105(b) ("[G]ross income does not include amounts ... paid, directly or indirectly, to the
taxpayer to reimburse the taxpayer for expenses incurred by him for... [his] medical care
184. The amount that can be excluded for dependent care assistance is subject to a
limitation of $5,000 for any taxable year ($2,500 in the case of a separate return filed by a
married individual). Id. § 129(a)(2)(A). The distributions made from the fund to the
employee are also excludable from income. Id. §§ 105-06.
185. For example, for a dependent care FSA, the employee must provide the name, tax
identification number, type, and amount of the requested expense before receiving a
distribution. Id. § 129(e)(1), (9).
186. See id. § 125(d)(2)(A) (prohibiting cafeteria plans that allow "deferred
compensation" from being eligible for exclusion from gross income); Treas. Reg. § 1.125-1,
Q&A 7 (1984) (stating that money that is rolled over to the next year is considered
deferred compensation); see also Cheryl Geerhold, Establishing Dependent-Care
Programs Through Cafeteria Plans: Fulfilling the Need for a Well-Balanced Benefit Menu,
25 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 455, 468 (1985) (suggesting that the "use-it-or-lose-it" rule be
abandoned to allow employees to roll over their unused nontaxable benefits).
187. 26 U.S.C. § 223(c)(2) (Supp. IV 2004) (defining high-deductible plans).
188. 26 U.S.C.A. § 223(d)(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2006).
189. Id. § 223(d)(1)(B) (providing that the trustee of the health savings account must
be a bank, an insurance company, or other qualified entity).
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The contributions made into an HSA are tax deductible to the
account holder. 90 Additionally, any amount paid out of an HSA that is
used to pay for qualified medical expenses is not included in gross
income. 91 In other words, monies saved and spent for qualified medical
expenses are not taxable. An HSA is distinct from an FSA because the
funds contributed into the account are not forfeited if unused by the end
of the year. Rather, the funds remain in the account even after the
holder no longer contributes into it. 192 As long as the funds are used for
qualified medical expenses, they are nontaxable.'93
Conceptually, the CSSA would operate like an FSA or HSA, but
logistically, some differences would exist. Like the FSA and HSA, the
funds would be withdrawn from the noncustodial parent's earnings and
deposited into an account. Similar to the HSA, the amount deposited in
the account would be tax deductible to the payor. 194 As is the case
under present law,195 the amounts paid to the custodial parent for the
benefit of the child would be tax free as well. The account would be
maintained by a financial institution that could accommodate a debit
card and check-writing function on the account for the use of the
custodial parent. Rather than the noncustodial parent drawing funds
from the account, as would be the case for an FSA or HSA to which he
contributed, the custodial parent would have sole access to the funds.
Any expense necessary to maintain the account could be offset by
interest earned on the deposited funds. 196
The attributes that would not apply in a Child Support Savings
Account include the reimbursement/substantiation function and the
use-it-or-lose-it status of the account. Reimbursement is not functional
because the noncontributing parent is using the funds, not the
contributing parent. The contributing parent is not getting
190. Id. § 223(a). There is a limit on the amount allowable as a deduction, which, for
an individual, is the lesser of either the annual deductible under the health insurance
coverage or $2,250. Id. § 223(b).
191. Id. § 223(f)(1).
192. I.R.S. Notice 2004-2, 2004-1 C.B. 269.
193. 26 U.S.C. § 223(f) (Supp. IV 2004). "Qualified medical expenses" are defined in
the statute. Id. § 223(d)(2).
194. Health Savings Accounts operate the same way. The amount paid into an HSA is
tax deductible to the individual making the payments. See id. §§ 62, 223(a). Alimony is
also treated as a deduction to gross income. Id. § 62(a)(10).
195. See id. § 71(c).
196. Financial institutions currently manage Health Savings Accounts and have
mechanisms in place to administer the accounts. Although a monthly maintenance fee is
charged to the user of the account, see Telephone Interview with Dana Moore, supra note
162, banks could consider using the interest earned on overnight funds in the accounts to
offset any fees associated with maintaining it.
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"reimbursed"; the noncontributing parent is getting paid. The detailed
reports generated from the debit card account would provide
substantiation for the expenses but would be available only to the
custodial parent.197 No additional recordkeeping or request for
payment would have to be made.
Additionally, the idea that any amounts unspent are forfeited
would be counterproductive in providing for the child. That feature has
been criticized in the context of FSAs.198 Because amounts can be
forfeited at the end of a calendar year, employees who use FSAs
underestimate their needs, causing inadequate coverage for care. This
feature should not be applied to CSSAs. Rather, relying in part on the
attributes of an HSA would complement the features of the FSAs.
Money for the needs of a child can be unpredictable and forfeiting those
funds hurts the child, not the parent. In a CSSA, the money should
accumulate in the account to be spent on the child at any time, with any
remainder being released to the child at his majority. 9
This proposal is not an attempt to handcuff custodial parents by
forcing them to nickel and dime every purchase made for a child. A
parent need not divide groceries in the grocery line or make clothing
purchases separately for children receiving child support. Custodial
parents would still be free to make decisions about their children's
needs and how and when to pay for them. In fact, custodial parents
should enjoy greater access to funds. Noncustodial parents may be
more likely to use CSSA accounts because they feel more confident that
a record is being kept of the purchases made for the child and because
they no longer have to physically give or write the check to the other
parent. Even if the custodial parent uses the account to pay solely for
the rent or mortgage payment, the noncustodian-in the event of
challenge-will be able to see that his support is not being used for the
needless wants of the custodian.
C. Congress Should Offer Tax Benefits to a CSSA
The second step in improving child support collection is federal
legislation offering tax benefits to noncustodial parents. As noted
above, programs already exist that provide tax benefits to individuals
who set aside funds for medical and dependent care expenses. An
197. If state law permits an accounting, the report could be sought by the
noncustodian. See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
198. See Geerhold, supra note 186, at 468; Conable Proposes Cafeteria Plan Rules, 23
TAX NOTES 567, 567-68 (1984).
199. Limitations should be placed on the account to ensure that taxpayers do not use a
CSSA as a tax-free vehicle to accumulate savings for the child.
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account to pay for the care of a child of a broken home is a natural
derivative. Contemporary social policy demands it.
Since enacting the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, Congress has
created a myriad of deductions and credits to accomplish societal
goals.2 °0 Currently, the Internal Revenue Code contains at least three
tax benefits available to parents with children. 20 1 First, 26 U.S.C. § 151
allows taxpayers a deduction for qualifying dependents.2  The
exemption applies generally for each child who is a student or who has
not yet reached the age of nineteen and who receives more than half of
his financial support from the taxpaying parent.2 3 This deduction
applies to all taxpayers with children and assists parents in providing for
those children.2" For those parents who are living apart, the custodial
parent is entitled to take the personal exemption for the child, unless
the parties agree otherwise.2 5
Section 21 of the Internal Revenue Code allows a credit for
working parents for expenses for household and dependent care
services that are necessary for the taxpayer's gainful employment.2 6
The dependent must be under the age of thirteen, and the credit is
limited to a certain percentage of expenses incurred based on the
taxpayer's adjusted gross income.0 7 If the parents are living apart, only
the custodial parent may claim the child care credit.2 18 This credit was
200. See Norman Y. Mineta, Federal Child Care Income Tax Provisions: Legislative
Initiatives in the Ninety-Ninth Congress, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 395, 397 n.12 (1985)
(citing deductions created to promote corporate charity as well as investment in federal
debt obligations).
201. See infra notes 202-12 and accompanying text. The Earned Income Credit is
available to individuals with and without children. See 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2000 & Supp. III
2003) (providing a credit against tax for individuals with a qualifying child and certain
other individuals without children).
202. 26 U.S.C. § 151(c) (2000). This exemption is currently valued at $2,000 per child,
with a phaseout for taxpayers who exceed a threshold amount of adjusted gross income.
Id. § 151(d).
203. See id. § 152 (establishing the criteria for a dependent).
204. See Mineta, supra note 200, at 405-09 (discussing the personal exemption and its
problems).
205. 26 U.S.C. § 152(e). The custodial parent must sign a written declaration that she
will not claim the child as a dependent and the noncustodial parent must attach the
declaration to his return. Id. State law may also prescribe when a noncustodial parent is
entitled to the dependency deduction. See e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9.315.18(B) (2000
& Supp. 2007) (providing that the noncustodial parent who pays 50% or more of the child
support obligation may be entitled to the dependency deduction).
206. 26 U.S.C. § 21 (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
207. Id. § 21(a)(2), (b)(1).
208. Id. § 21(e)(5).
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passed in response to the growing number of working parents and the
need for affordable child care. °9
Likewise, § 129 of the Internal Revenue Code provides for flexible
spending accounts to be used by working parents with children to save
for dependent care expenses on a tax-free basis.210 Section 129 was
passed as an additional tax incentive for workers caring for a dependent.
Although parents are unable to take advantage of both § 21 and § 129
benefits simultaneously,211 Congress has established ways to subsidize
childcare for working parents.212
Congress should respond through tax legislation to the growing
number of parents collecting financial support for their children. Over
the years, Congress has responded to the needs of parents to provide for
their children. This response expanded as women entered the
workforce and child care was unaffordable for many families. Providing
a tax-free vehicle in which noncustodial parents can deposit child
support will filter more dollars to children and their custodians,
enriching this congressional policy of aid to parents and children.
Currently, child support payments are not deductible to the
noncustodial parent and are not included as income to the custodian.213
Alimony payments, on the other hand, are deductible from gross
income to the payor 4 and are includable as income to the recipient.2 5
This distinction has been criticized as inequitable,26 and proposals have
been made to treat alimony and child support similarly, in part to
209. See Mineta, supra note 200, at 397-405 (discussing the household and dependent
care credit).
210. See 26 U.S.C. § 129 (2000) (establishing a deduction for dependent care assistance
programs).
211. See id. § 21(c) (providing that the dollar limit allowed under a § 21 credit "shall be
reduced by the aggregate amount excludable from gross income under section 129 for the
taxable year.")
212. Mineta, supra note 200, at 396 ("[Tihe largest federal subsidy for child-care
expenses is provided by the Internal Revenue Code.")
213. 26 U.S.C. § 71(c). Child support is excluded from the definition of alimony, and
any payment that is reduced when a child attains a specific age, marries, dies, or similar
contingencies, will be treated as support. Id.
214. Id. § 215.
215. Id. § 71(a). Alimony is defined as any cash payment made pursuant to a written
divorce or separation agreement as long as there is no liability to make the payment after
the death of the payee spouse and the spouses are not members of the same household at
the time the payment is made. Id.
216. Wendy Gerzog Shaller, On Public Policy Grounds, A Limited Tax Credit for
Child Support and Alimony, 11 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 321, 330 (1994). As a result of these
distinctions, parties often attempt to classify child support as alimony to shift the tax
burden to the party in the lower tax bracket, generally the custodial, recipient parent. See
id. at 330-31 (noting that although legislation has made it more difficult, such
manipulation is still possible).
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encourage the payment of child support.2 17 In 1989, the ABA House of
Delegates adopted a resolution to allow a deduction for "family
support" to include both alimony and child support.218 Rather than a
deduction, one scholar has proposed a limited credit for alimony and
child support payments that would not exceed $2,250.21
9
Similar to these proposals, under a CSSA, if a noncustodial parent
paid child support into the account, he would receive a deduction for
the amount paid.220  Some may argue that any tax benefit to
noncustodial parents unfairly discriminates against custodial parents or
parents of intact families who also "pay" to support their children.
Raising children is an expensive endeavor, and some may insist that any
parent with a child should enjoy the benefit of additional tax savings.222
As compared to the custodial parent, however, giving the noncustodial
parent a tax benefit appropriately equalizes the tax benefits for raising
the child in separate households. Under present law, the custodial
parent is entitled to the personal exemption for the child on her tax
return.2 3 Even though the noncustodian pays support, only one parent
can claim the child's personal exemption.224 Allowing the noncustodian
to pay his support tax free provides him with a similar tax benefit in
raising the child.
217. Id. at 335-37. Professor Shaller's proposal stemmed from social policy concerns
about unpaid child support should be paid. She explained: "With respect to both alimony
and child support, nonpayment effectively means more individuals who need public
support subsidies. In order to provide taxpayers with an incentive to modify their
behavior and make private payments, Congress should legislate a credit for both types of
personal payments." Id. at 341; see also Deborah H. Schenk, Simplification for Individual
Taxpayers: Problems and Proposals, 45 TAx L. REV. 121, 162 (1989) (suggesting private
ordering by spouses such that any amounts would be treated as alimony unless the parties
agreed otherwise in writing); Laura Bigler, Note, A Change Is Needed: The Taxation of
Alimony and Child Support, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 361, 378-39 (2000) (proposing a
deduction for the payor parent for alimony and child support as an incentive to pay).
218. Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at G-1 (Aug. 11, 1989).
219. Shaller, supra note 216, at 337. Professor Shaller suggested a limited credit, rather
than a deduction, so that all taxpayers would enjoy the same benefit and taxpayers with
high incomes would not have an additional opportunity to save taxes through income
shifting. Id.
220. As under current law, see 26 U.S.C. § 71(c), child support payments paid out of
the CSSA would not be included as income to the custodian.
221. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 308 (13th ed. 2003)
("The idea behind the denial of a deduction for child support is that if the payor had custody
of, and supported, the children, there would be no deduction for the cost of the support, so
there is no justification for deduction of similar amounts when made to a former spouse.").
222. Id.
223. 26 U.S.C. §§ 151,152(c), (e) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
224. See 26 U.S.C. § 152(e) (Supp. IV 2004) (providing specific rules for which a parent
is entitled to the dependency deduction when the parents are divorced).
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As for parents of intact families, Congress has passed several tax
benefits for parents with children. 225 Children of broken homes or
single-parent households, as a matter of social policy, deserve additional
protection because of their unchosen, unfortunate circumstances. The
United States Government has identified specific groups of people who
deserve governmental assistance because of their status. Programs such
as Medicare and Social Security provide elderly Americans with public
funds because of their age and health. Through no fault of their own,
children of broken homes are forced to deal with the economic
consequences of divorce and living in a single-parent home. It is
indisputable that divorce creates a change in the family's economic
circumstances. 226 Putting aside the psychological stresses children are
forced to endure, maintaining two households for a child inevitably will
strain a family's finances. Providing a tax benefit to these parents is a
valid social policy.
CONCLUSION
Over the last two decades, the child support enforcement paradigm
has begun a gradual shift. Rather than implementing measures to deal
with collection after default, state and federal legislators have focused
on laws that prevent parents from defaulting on child support in the first
place.227 A Child Support Savings Account supports that objective.
Income withholding, data collection, and license revocation have
improved child support collection, 228 but a gap still exists. Closing the
gap by providing positive motivation for maintaining child support may
be the answer.
A Child Support Savings Account will permit direct deduction
from the payor's wages, establish a deposit account to be accessed by
the payee, and provide tax benefits to both parents. A CSSA targets
previously unaddressed causes of nonpayment, which should increase
the collection of child support. Although nearly impossible to ease the
tension between two parents caring separately for the child, a
mechanism that limits interaction about finances and provides equal tax
benefits to the parents may improve the parent-to-parent relationship
and positively impact the child.
225. See supra notes 201-12 and accompanying text.
226. Three-fourths of women in the Wallerstein and Kelly study reported a notable
decline in their standard of living. WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 77, at 23.
227. KRAUSE, supra note 137, at 1104.
228. See supra Part I.B.
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Every branch of government has made clear that enforcement of
child support is a top priority. President Clinton aptly stated, "[I]f you
owe child support, you better pay it. If you deliberately refuse to pay it,
you can find your face posted in the Post Office. We'll track you down
with computers.... We'll track you down with law enforcement. We'll
find you through the Internet. ' 229 Passing legislation at the state and
federal level is another avenue to increase collection of child support,
albeit with a more positive tone. Implementing a Child Support Savings
Account that can provide financial as well as psychological benefits is a
goal worth pursuing.
229. President William J. Clinton, Remarks on Child Support to the Citizens of Denver
(July 18, 1996) (U.S. Newswire July 23, 1996) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
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